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In Science as Social Knowledge in 1990 and The Fate of Knowledge in 2002, Helen Longino develops an epistemic theory known as Critical Contextual Empiricism (I will refer to this as “CCE”). While Longino’s work has been generally well-received, there have been a number of criticisms of CCE raised in the philosophical literature in recent years. In this paper I outline the key elements of Longino’s theory and propose a few modifications to the four norms offered by the account. The version of CCE I defend, which draws on lessons learned in the medical context in recent years, gives principles of diversity a more central role than the original and provides greater specification of two of the other norms. It also offers additional resources for defending CCE against a criticism leveled against it by Alvin Goldman and one general concern arising out of a recent work by David Michaels. I provide responses to these criticisms in the final section of the paper. In light of the variety of social pressures influencing contemporary scientific research, and the role of science in shaping public policy, I argue that a rigorous social epistemology such as CCE is indispensable for understanding and assessing contemporary scientific practice.

Part I: Critical Contextual Empiricism

It is generally acknowledged that scientific inquiry is shaped by certain constitutive or epistemic values such as consistency, simplicity and empirical adequacy, which play an important role in guiding scientific inquiry.​[1]​ In addition to these constitutive values, contextual values – social, political and economic values – shape the practices, questions and data, as well as the specific and general assumptions of scientific inquiry.​[2]​ We have wide-ranging empirical evidence of the contextually value-laden nature of science, based on historical and contemporary case studies. Much of this evidence can be found in the literature produced over the past half century by scholars in science and technology studies, sociology of science, and feminist philosophy of science.​[3]​ Given extensive literature documenting the presence of social values in science, contemporary philosophers of science acknowledge that scientific inquiry is not free from contextual values. The philosophical project is to find ways to understand (and perhaps limit) their role in the production of scientific knowledge. 
The mechanisms Longino provides for managing values stem from a claim about the underdetermination of theories by data and the mediating role of background assumptions in inquiry. Underdetermination is “the in-principle possibility of constructing multiple empirically equivalent, mutually inconsistent theories for any given body of evidence.”​[4]​ Now an entrenched problem in philosophy of science, underdetermination is primarily an epistemological problem concerning our ability to produce and justify knowledge using only hypotheses and evidence. The choice of hypothesis cannot be fully determined on the basis of the evidence alone. This is because the evidence is consistent with more than one hypothesis, creating a gap in scientific reasoning. This gap, argues Longino, is filled by background assumptions.​[5]​  And it is people with perspectives and background assumptions that are different from one’s own who are in a position to critically evaluate one’s assumptions. Traditional accounts of justification, which emphasize particular principles of inference, are still necessary, though insufficient for a full account of knowledge-production. Longino offers a reconceptualization of justification that preserves many of the traditional elements but adds a social dimension. It is no longer possible for a person to produce knowledge in isolation; only when her background assumptions have been subjected to the scrutiny of others can she be said to have knowledge. CCE is an attempt to improve standards of justification in a way that, rather than eliminating values in science, acknowledges them and subjects them to critique. 
The mechanisms Longino proposes for ensuring broad critical debate on background assumptions will be referred to as the CCE norms. According to CCE, scientific communities are objective to the degree that they meet four criteria: 

1.	Recognized Avenues for Criticism: there must be recognized avenues for criticism of evidence, of methods, and of assumptions and reasoning.
2.	Responsiveness to Criticism: the community as a whole must be responsive to such criticism.
3.	Shared Public Standards: there must be shared standards that critics can invoke.
4.	Tempered Equality of Authority: intellectual authority must be shared equally among qualified practitioners.​[6]​

Collectively, these norms ensure that the conditions for effective public debate are in place. 

Part II: Modifications to CCE

While I agree that the four CCE norms do provide some protection for the social structures that contribute to effective critical debate, I think it is worth being cautious about what each norm accomplishes. If we examine the function of each of four norms closely, and reflect on the challenges to such norms in the medical context, we see that three modifications are necessary. 

1. Recognized Avenues for Criticism: Any Avenue?

Let’s begin with a problem that arises in the context of medical research. As many of you are probably aware, in recent years pharmaceutical companies have been employing a number of tactics designed to suppress negative results from clinical trials. Tactics include delaying publication (sometimes for years), publishing in little-known journals or in other languages, and most notably by refusing to publish some trial results at all.​[7]​ In cases where commercial interests limit the presentation of research results to the community by restricting publication of the negative results of research, the presence of recognized avenues for criticism will not, alone, bring these hidden results forward.  
Longino’s first norm aims to protect communities – particularly scientific communities – from secrecy and the selective presentation of information. Given that CCE is built on principles of open critical discussion, the sort of failure to disclose exemplified in the case of recent pharmaceutical industry tactics requires attention. The norm should protect the publicity and transparency of ideas presented within a community. It cannot do this if it only protects venues for criticism without specifying further criteria that community members or venues must meet. The first norm needs to capture the expectation that members of the community will submit their ideas for consideration in recognized community venues. In addition, it should require that presentation of ideas in these venues occurs under conditions of transparency and full disclosure, and in a timely manner. Several developments in the medical context in recent years, for instance, expectations that contributors provide declarations of conflicts of interest when publishing articles in medical journals, provide concrete examples of how these elements of the revised first norm would be supported.

2. Tempered Equality of Authority…Or Diversity?

The recommendations I will make with respect to the next norm are based on research I did a few years ago on debates over evidence by complementary and alternative medical researchers (some of you have heard me speak on this before). Longino suggests that equality of authority is required to ensure that “every member of the community be regarded as capable of contributing” to any debate.​[8]​ It also protects the results of community debate from being secured by “unforced assent”; tempered equality of authority shields inquiry from undue influence from the economically or politically powerful.​[9]​ There are two problems with this norm as described: it is redundant and it is too weak. 
First, there is reason to think that the requirement of shared community standards accomplishes Longino’s goal of ensuring any member of a community has the authority to engage with a debate. Shared standards are the only legitimate basis for inclusion and exclusion of perspectives in a given community, so any further restrictions will be unjustified. Thus the shared standards norm protects the voices of the oppressed. In fact, the protection provided under the shared standards criterion is arguably stronger because the burden of justification is on those who would attempt to exclude critics, rather than on those who want to make a claim to have their voice heard within a particular community based on their (tempered) authority and expertise. 
Second, the requirement of tempered equality is too weak. The norm ensures that, within a given knowledge-productive community, there is tempered equality of authority. But what the norm needs to ensure is that there is sufficient attention to those perspectives outside a given community (provided they meet the shared standards criterion: I will say more about this in a moment). As it currently stands, the norm fails to protect the perspectives of those people who are in best position to highlight deficiencies or idiosyncracies in a community’s background assumptions. Diverse perspectives contribute to the methodological objectivity of scientific inquiry and therefore to knowledge. If we fail to attend to the arguments made by those presenting unorthodox views, “the assumptions shaping our inferences [will be] hidden, [and] we will not see the level at which we might entertain and seriously develop new ideas”​[10]​ The process is characterized as one in which knowledge is, “produced collectively through the clashing and meshing of a variety of points of view.”​[11]​ In light of this, the one element of the fourth criterion worth retaining is its underlying commitment to diverse perspectives. Despite a great deal of discussion about the importance of diverse perspectives throughout Longino’s two books and many articles, such perspectives are not adequately protected by the CCE norms. It is diverse perspectives that lead us to objectivity. We would do better to drop the redundant elements of the fourth criterion and focus it on the preservation and cultivation of diverse perspectives. I believe this preserves what matters in Longino’s fourth norm while clarifying it somewhat. 

3. Shared Public Standards: How Shared Are They?





To sum up thus far, I believe that the modifications I have suggested to this point are in line with the goals and spirit of CCE. My revised set of CCE norms is thus:

1.	Avenues for Criticism – there must be recognized avenues for criticism, and these avenues must be publicly accessible and require transparent disclosure of all relevant information (including competing interests) from those who present their ideas. It must also be a community requirement that all members present their ideas for critical scrutiny if they wish them to be recognized as knowledge.
2.	Responsiveness to Criticism – the community must be responsive to criticism.
3.	Shared Public Standards – there must be some shared standards that determine community membership. Outsiders to a particular community are welcome to engage in critical debates as long as they share at least one of the community standards with the target community.
4.	Cultivation of Diverse Perspectives – communities must cultivate diverse perspectives, that is, the perspectives of those who express strong dissent.

Part III: Objections and Replies 





Do communities exhibiting the qualities required by CCE produce knowledge? Alvin Goldman presents a test case. He describes a religious community in which members form beliefs on the basis of the dictates of a sacred text. Because different interpretations of the text are possible, critical discussions and debates over the correct interpretation of the text are common and even encouraged. Community members adjust their interpretations in light of insights by others in accordance with publicly available standards. According to Goldman, this community appears to adhere to the four (original) CCE norms, but we would not want to classify this community as a knowledge-producing community. 
But as we’ve seen in my discussion of diversity earlier, communities have to be open not only to the criticisms of community members but to the criticisms of members of other communities who share at least one of their public standards. Insofar as religious communities are closed to the criticisms of other communities – that is, insofar as they are dogmatic in their commitment to certain texts even when confronted with good evidence in favour of other texts, or against all texts – they fail the requirement of responsiveness. Further, on the basis of my discussion on diversity, such communities would have to cultivate strong dissent. But it is unlikely that they do so. This leads to Goldman’s core concern: the same sort of dogmatism seen in religious communities is present and vital in science. He characterizes the commitment to scientific methods as dogmatic because “researchers aren’t invited to challenge those [scientific] methods when they submit their research papers.”​[12]​ Further, even if scientific methods are challenged in some venue “the challenge is assessed by appeal to logic and mathematics. And aren’t those standards dogmatic in some sense?”​[13]​ His point is that Longino’s requirement that communities remain open to criticism of their methods (and, I would add, cultivate diverse perspectives) is too strong and that no knowledge-producing community will be adequate to the task.
In the medical context, physicians do criticize research methods: that is what critical essays and opinion sections of medical journals are for and why there are usually journal sections specifically designed for these sorts of debates. The commitment that members of particular scientific communities have to methods and methodologies is not dogmatic, and insofar as there is a tendency toward dogmatism because researchers do not tend to challenge the methods used in their community, this is a significant failure. I’ve spent a lot of time critiquing the evidence-based medicine movement, which I believe, in its current form at least, does shut down opportunities for members of the medical community to engage critically in debates over the value of different research methods and the rules of evidence codified in evidence hierarchies. 
This is because current formulations of EBM encourage physicians to uncritically trust the pre-digested synopses and summaries of the research evidence produced by experts. These synopses and summaries are constructed on the basis of assumptions about what counts as a good research methods and physicians are not expected – or even trained – to engage in critical evaluation of these assumptions. This is a real problem in medicine today and I would expect CCE to have the resources to criticize the dogmatic commitment to evidence-based practice that is becoming more and more common.




In his 2008 book “Doubt is their product: How industry’s assault on science threatens your health” David Michaels provides dozens of examples of industries which adopted a tactic of “manufacturing uncertainty.” In each example, industry representatives became aware of high quality empirical evidence demonstrating the harm caused by their product, and, recognizing that they weren’t going to be able to provide similarly high-quality evidence to the contrary, they pursued tactics designed to call the current evidence into question. They didn’t have to prove that their product was safe, they just had to cast some doubt on the evidence showing their product was harmful. And then they had to keep this up over time, perhaps pursuing small research studies to use as ‘contrary evidence’ or saying that the evidence was interesting but that more research was needed to really conclusively determine whether the product was harmful.
These examples highlight a common worry about Longino’s account of knowledge-production: because it relies on critical discussion for the justification of knowledge-claims, it is open to abuse by those who would prolong this discussion in order to prevent any decisive claim to knowledge. Critical Contextual Empiricism must walk a fine line between the dangers of claimed certainty (perhaps driven by the need to make decisions on the basis of current knowledge) and those of manufactured uncertainty (where interested parties prolong debate in order to buy time to continue to market and sell their product). 
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